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As ransomware spreads, victimization rates escalate. A Finnish cybersecurity firm’s F-Secure 
State of Cyber Security 2017 report stated that there was only one ransomware “variant” in 2012. 
This increased to 35 in 2015 and 193 in 2016.(1) Individuals, corporations, banks, educational 
establishments, hospitals, and government agencies have all been held hostage by ransomware 
and blackmailed into paying out in crypto-currency—typically, bitcoin—to retrieve their data.(2) 
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As a recent example, the WannaCry ransomware started on 12 May 2017. It infected about 
300,000 computers in 150 countries(3) and cost computer users thousands of dollars in ransom 
money and billions in lost productivity.(4) Hospitals in the UK’s National Health Service were 
forced to cancel surgeries. Ambulances were diverted, and patient records were inaccessible. 
WannaCry used 28 languages to release ransom messages, including European and Asian 
dialects.(5) The extortionists demanded that victims pay US$300–$600 in bitcoin (about 0.17–
0.34 BTC based on the price of bitcoin at that time). WannaCry extortionists relied on three 
bitcoin wallet addresses, yet they still needed to perform manual decryption of victims’ files after 
receiving payment. In other attacks, more sophisticated ransomware programs were employed. 
These attacks dynamically generated a new bitcoin address for each infected machine, and a 
smart contract governed the process of decrypting victims’ computers: if ransom money is paid 
to X address, the files in victim Y’s computers get decrypted.(6) 
 
The escalation of ransomware could be fueled in part by the diffusion of crypto-currencies. 
Without crypto-currencies, the creation of ransomware such as WannaCry would not be as 
desirable because other forms of payment have greater “criminal” traceability. Surveys have 
revealed that some companies hold supplies of bitcoins so that they can pay extortionists if ever 
necessary.(7) In this article, we examine cryptocurrencies’ effects on ransomware and look at 
what might influence a victim’s decision to pay. 
 
Crypto-Currency Ransomware: How It Works 
 
Before crypto-currencies, extortionists usually asked victims to send money via money transfer 
agencies or deposit directly to bank accounts. However, such transfers had more traceability if 
law enforcement got involved. Crypto-currencies are somewhat of an online extortionists’ dream 
come true. For instance, it is almost impossible to pinpoint the perpetrators based on bitcoin 
addresses. 
 
Bitcoins can be converted into cash secretively through third parties. Pinpointing the extortionist 
is of little value if that person is in a jurisdiction that does not cooperate in detection. For 
instance, cybersecurity researchers at Google, Symantec, FireEye, and others reportedly found 
evidence linking WannaCry ransomware attacks to North Korea.(8) Given that North Korea 
maintains few diplomatic ties, it is difficult to take actions against such an isolated country. 
 
Ransomware involving cryptocurrencies might increase because such currencies are becoming 
more widely adopted. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), 10 percent of global 
GDP will be stored on blockchain by 2027(9) compared to 0.025 percent in 2016.(10) 
 
While bitcoin transactions are difficult to track, they are not completely anonymous. All 
transactions are recorded in a permanent public ledger. After the bitcoins are moved from that 
address, financial movements can be traced. Users can be traced through IP addresses and money 
flows. Elliptic, a blockchain intelligence company, uses artificial intelligence to scan and analyze 
the bitcoin network to identify suspicious behavior patterns in bitcoin transactions. It can trace 
transactions to individuals or groups. Elliptic’s services are used by online exchanges and law 
enforcement to detect money laundering.(11) 
 
Extortionists can further reduce the probability of detection using next-generation crypto-
currencies such as Monero, Dash, and Z-Cash. These have built-in anonymity features. For 
instance, Monero is arguably the most anonymous crypto-currency. In 2016, Alpha-Bay, which 
might be the most widely used darknet market, started accepting Monero.(12) Monero is less 
widespread than bitcoin—for instance, as of May 2017, Monero’s total value was around $425 
million, or about 1 percent of bitcoin’s.(13) Moreover, converting Monero into real-world cash is 
more difficult than with bitcoin. However, this problem might not be as significant in the future 
if there is more diffusion and competition in crypto-currencies. 
 
Factors Affecting the Propensity to Pay Ransom 
 
According to Elliptic, as of 16 May 2017, four days after Wanna-Cry spread, the amount of 
ransom paid out by victims to the bitcoin wallet addresses was about $86,000 (46.4 BTC). If 
everyone infected had paid, the criminals would have received at least $60 million. What they 
did receive translated to a payout rate of about 0.14 percent.(14) Even after more than a week, 
the amount paid out did not increase much. Data from Elliptic indicated that, as of 23 May 2017, 
WannaCry victims had paid less than $120,000 to three bitcoin wallets 
(www.elliptic.co/wannacry). 
 
Another estimate of the WannaCry impact suggested that as of 15 May 2017, payments had been 
made by about 190 computers out of approximately 300,000 computers that were believed to be 
infected.(15) This put the number of computers complying with the extortionists’ demands at 
0.06 percent. 
 
So, what factors are associated with this low payout ratio? We summarize some of these key 
factors in Table 1 and discuss them in detail next. 
 
Table 1. Victim characteristics and situational factors affecting propensity to pay ransom. 











Likely to have backup and data-
retrieval plans in place 
More likely to use available 
fixes 
Unaffordable ransom (as with 
students in China) 
2 
High degree of readiness to pay 
ransom (mission-critical digital 
data is threatened) 
High 4 
Often new users 
Might use older technologies and 
pirated software (for example, 
most computer users in India and 
China) 
Low degree of digitization of 
values and economic activities 
3 
Follow detailed step-by-step 
instructions provided by 
extortionists 
Consult with cybersecurity firms 
and experts regarding the 
process and appropriateness of 
complying with extortionists 
demands 
 
Complexity of Complying with Extortionists’ Demands 
 
First, the amount of money the WannaCry extortionists asked their victims to pay—$300 to 
$600—is not high. Rather, one key reason why victims do not pay is that complying with the 
extortionists’ demands can be complicated. This is because of idea of crypto-currency is a new 
concept for many victims. Furthermore, attaining bitcoins is not easy. It can take days to create 
an account by registering with a bitcoin brokerage or exchange. Users are required to go through 
a verification process. The account then needs to be connected a bank account able to receive 
bitcoins.(16) 
 
Second, consider this problem for non-US countries. In some countries, exchanges that handle 
bitcoin transactions are licensed and regulated like traditional money transfer businesses. It is 
reported that as of May 2016, there were around 44 exchanges worldwide for bitcoins.(17) The 
first Malaysian Bitcoin Exchange, Xbit Asia, was opened in September 2016 (bit.ly/2v8clcs). 
Before that, most Malaysians who wanted bitcoins got them through exchanges in 
Singapore.(17) Likewise, to purchase bitcoins in India, a buyer needed to provide a permanent 
account number (or PAN, a unique, 10-digit alphanumeric identity assigned to a taxpayer by the 
Income Tax Department) and know your customer (KYC) details.(18) Loading a bitcoin wallet 
through startups such as Zebpay, Coinsecure, and Unocoin can take 48 hours. Bitcoin 
transactions are currently a regulatory grey area of economic activity in India and are also 
considered taboo. The three-day deadline for the WannaCry ransom payments was thus too short 
for most Indian victims. 
 
Countries that do not have bitcoin brokerages or exchanges add further complexity. As was the 
case with Malaysian consumers before 2016, money had to be converted into another currency 
before being depositing into a bitcoin wallet. 
 
Still another source of complexity is that victims lack control over the extortionists’ guarantees. 
There is no guarantee of data unlock even if victims pay.(19) According to a 2016 Fortinet 
report, about a quarter of organizations that paid ransoms were not able to recover their data.(18) 
Recent WannaCry victims are believed to be in a worse situation. According to the Israeli 
computer security consultancy Check Point, due to a fault in WannaCry’s encryption software, it 
is almost impossible to decrypt a user’s data after payment has been made.(20) 
 
A further complexity arises from the fact that most cyber-liability insurance policies have 
exclusion and cooperation clauses that prohibit businesses from paying ransoms without pre-
approval. If a victim fails to comply and pays the ransom, insurers might cancel the insurance 
coverage, including the costs of disruptions to the businesses, remediation expenses, and costs 
associated with notifying customers.(21) 
 
Gravity of the Problem 
 
Extortionists might threaten that if victims fail to pay after a specified time interval, their files 
will be permanently locked—that is, the data is not coming back. This becomes a terrible 
problem for those who do not backup their data. If one victim faces more severe consequences 
than others, they might be more likely to pay out. For instance, it was reported that extortionists 
held an Austrian hotel network for ransom, demanding $1,800 in bitcoin. The gravity of the 
situation became clearer when the guests could not check in and out and were locked out of their 




We now look at each of Table 1’s four cells in detail. 
 
Cell 1: Larger organizations will likely have data retrieval plans in place.(23) Ransomware 
attacks should have smaller impacts on them, so ransom payments might not occur. Furthermore, 
following the WannaCry ransomware attack, Microsoft published a patch for operating systems 
for which it was no longer providing support. They included Windows XP, Windows Server 
2003, and Windows 8.(24) Larger organizations should be technically savvy enough to 
implement these available fixes quickly. 
 
Cell 2: If critical data is at risk, organizations in this situation should realize that they require a 
higher degree of immediate response. One study reported that 33 percent of UK corporations had 
bought bitcoins so that they would be prepared to pay ransoms. More than 35 percent of large 
firms (with more than 2,000 employees) were willing to pay as much as £50,000 (US$65,000) to 
unlock files containing critical data, such as intellectual property.(25) And a university in the US 
reportedly created an account to be prepared for ransomware attacks.(7) 
 
Cell 3: Extortionists might operate call centers to offer technical support to simplify the payout 
process for victims.(2) There are reports that when victims call, extortionists will walk them 
through the process of getting their files back.(20) Criminals can provide detailed explanations 
about attaining bitcoins and then transferring them. From the extortionists’ standpoint, such 
services are likely to be effective for situations represented by cell 3, which have both high 
complexity and high gravity. 
 
However, some organizations might lack cybersecurity expertise and experience in dealing with 
cyberattacks such as those involving ransomware. It is suggested that 85 percent of US medical 
institutions lack qualified personnel to perform basic cybersecurity tasks, such as patching 
software and monitoring threats.(26) 
 
Cell 4: Most users from developing countries belong to cell 4. Pirated software in developing 
countries arguably accelerates the spread of ransomware.(27) About 4,000 of the 40,000 
institutions affected by WannaCry in China were universities. Concerns were raised about 
students being unable to access their work.(19) However, the amount asked by the 
extortionists—$300 to $600—was too expensive for most students.(23) 
 
At the time of this writing, another attack, known as Petya, occurred, impacting the Ukraine 
government’s banks and electricity grid, as well as other countries and corporations 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/27/petya-ransomware-attack-strikes-
companiesacross-europe). One frightening aspect here is that these attacks are mainly on 
computers, not devices. It is not far-fetched to imagine future scenarios in which devices, such as 
pacemakers and infusion pumps, become targets—for example, pay now, or your insulin pump 
will be turned off. The growth in ransomware is one of the “darker” activities created by the 
diffusion of cryptocurrencies. Crypto-currency is too complicated for many computer users to 
understand. And even if they are willing to pay, victims might not know where to start or how to 
navigate the process. However, IT professionals need to learn about crypto-currencies and 
blockchain. Crypto-currencies and ransomware are not going away. By employing more 
sophisticated modus operandi, more resourceful and skilled extortionists will increase their 
success rates. IT professionals need to understand this space and how to help their organizations 
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